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A large body of cross-country empirical evidence identifies monetary policy and trade integration
as key determinants of business cycle co-movement. Partially consistent with this, many argue that
the re-emergence of the gold standard allowed for the global transmission of a deflationary shock in
1929 that culminated in the Great Depression. It is puzzling then to see decreased co-movement between
1920 and 1927 when international integration increased and nations returned to the gold standard.
Fixed exchange rates and global trade were also on the rise after 1932, but co-movement declined
again.  Our empirical results shows that exchange rate regimes and trade were associated with higher
co-movement at the bilateral level while common shocks and exchange control policies also mattered.
Much of the fall after 1932 was driven by the rise of smaller blocs of monetary and trade cooperation
and an inter-bloc fall in co-movement.
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I.  Introduction 
It is now widely agreed that monetary and exchange rate policies were central to 
economic outcomes during the Great Depression. The gold standard, a global system of 
fixed exchange rates has also been implicated in the transmission of a deflationary shock 
that deepened the Great Depression (Choudhri and Kochin 1980, Eichengreen, 1992a, 
Temin, 1993). Nations that broke free from the gold standard in the 1930s recovered 
more quickly and experienced divergent economic outcomes from those clinging to the 
increasingly anachronistic metallic regime (Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985 and 1986 and 
Eichengreen, 1992a). 
The new consensus that the gold standard mattered for the international spread of 
the Great Depression does not, however, preclude further study into the international 
transmission of economic shocks during the entirety of the volatile interwar period. The 
role of trade flows and autarkic monetary policies in shaping co-movement during the 
Depression years has not been systematically studied. Nor have researchers 
simultaneously tested for both trade and monetary factors in transmission of the 
Depression. It seems natural to allow for this however since a large body of empirical 
research on “output co-movement” focuses on trade flows (e.g., Frankel and Rose, 1998) 
as well as monetary regimes (e.g., Artis and Zheng, 1997 Clark and van Wincoop, 2001). 
We expand on this theme and include the years before and after the Great Depression -- 
two decades of great economic change and high volatility.  
Specifically, we study bilateral co-movement of industrial production 
conditioning on multiple key determinants including fixed exchange rate regimes,  trade   3
integration and other interventionist policies. To date, no systematic cross-country study 
of this period that tests for multiple channels of transmission has been undertaken. Of 
course, one limitation of our empirical approach is that it does not shed too much light on 
transmission of shocks versus co-movement of underlying shocks. Still, our study has 
significant potential to explain the paradoxical behavior of co-movement in the inter-war 
period.  
By this we mean that trade and monetary regimes, factors which seem to be 
strongly associated with co-movement in recent decades, do not obviously provide a 
complete explanation of the data during the interwar period.  Global trade integration did 
not shrink and international capital flows resumed for many countries between 1920 and 
1927. Nations re-adopted the gold standard from the mid-1920s.  And yet, as integration 
surged in the early 1920s, the average degree of co-movement did not trend upwards. 
Instead, the data in Figure 1 show a U-shaped pattern with a trough coinciding with 1926 
and 1927. An empirical challenge arises again after 1932 when synchronization 
decreased but monetary and trade integration made a comeback. This could be 
rationalized as the consequence of the myriad autarkic policies put in place after 1931 
and the rise of exchange rate instability (e.g., Basu and Taylor, 1999). However, a more 
accurate description of events is that, rather than going completely autarkic, there was a 
re-configuration of monetary coordination, and an active effort to revive trade. Crucially, 
both of these changes occurred within smaller blocs including the Reichsmark bloc, the 
British Commonwealth and the Sterling Bloc.  Our evidence is consistent with the idea 
that the decline in average co-movement arose in the context of strong within-bloc co-
movement and weak inter-bloc co-movement.    4
 
II. Monetary Policy, Integration and Business Cycles in the Interwar Period 
 
After the Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1919, nations travelled a treacherous 
road to recovery with their ultimate destiny being the Great Depression. We provide a 
stylized view of the path of monetary policy and international trade during the interwar 
period by breaking the years 1920 to 1938 into four phases. Our goal is to briefly survey 
the issues relevant to the transmission of the international business cycle between 1920 
and 1938. For reference, Figure 1 shows the average value of the correlation of the de-
trended industrial output indexes for our sample within each two-year period, the average 
across all country pairs in the sample of the percentage of time the pair had a fixed 
exchange rate (e.g., the gold standard) and the average across all country pairs of the ratio 
of total trade to total pair GDP. We discuss the construction of these variables below. 
 
II.A Period I: Reconstruction of the International System 
World War I drastically changed the international supply chain, national balance 
sheets and price levels. Between 1914 and 1919 prices rose just under twofold in the 
United States, slightly more than twofold in Britain, and ten-fold in France. Between 
1920 and 1928, most nations attempted to return to the gold standard with various levels 
of alacrity to their pre-war parity. The United States and Great Britain drove prices down 
to levels consistent with their pre-war gold parities. By 1925 Britain had re-anchored 
itself to the gold standard. Elsewhere in Europe, political disputes over the burden of 
adjustment led to intense monetary shocks and high- or hyper-inflation. France settled for 
a return to the gold standard at a depreciated parity (de facto in 1926 and de jure in 1928)   5
as did Germany but with a new currency in place after a bout of hyperinflation. On the 
periphery, for instance in Scandinavia, nations used a mix of deflationary policies and 
devaluation to attain monetary stability (Klovland, 1998).  
The incipient reconstruction of the international economy with rising or stable 
trade flows and resurgent capital movements may have also increased the unconditional, 
raw cross-country co-movement of de-trended industrial output but this is only evident 
after 1927 as seen in Figure 1.  In 1925 Winston Churchill, chancellor of the exchequer, 
exclaimed  that “all the countries related to the gold standard will move together like 
ships in a harbour whose gangways are joined and who rise and fall together with the 
tide.” (Foreman-Peck, 1995 p. 226). Such Churchillian co-movement did not appear until 
the monetary shock of higher US interest rates which occurred in 1928. 
 
II.B Period II The Gold Exchange Standard and the Initial Shock  
By 1928 the international gold exchange standard operated to connect many 
disparate financial systems. For those that argue that the gold standard mattered, the 
impulse for the Great Depression occurred in 1928 when US Federal Reserve policy 
became tighter.
1  American monetary policy pinched less-developed commodity export-
based economies by dampening American demand for their products. Elsewhere, fragile 
commitments and weak credibility in adherence to the gold standard forced nations to 
follow the rise in American interest rates with even larger hikes, spreading deflation 
worldwide via the gold standard and severely damaging aggregate demand (Eichengreen, 
1992a). Throughout 1930, nations attempted to maintain the gold standard, but by the 
time that Britain had left gold in September 1931 it was clear to most (but not all) that the 
                                                 
1 The German economy headed into its downturn in 1927 with its own stock market crash.   6
gold standard was a constraint in terms of recovery and a channel for transmission.  
Churchill’s joyous prediction was rendered a ghastly reality. 
It has long been argued that countries not following the gold standard avoided this 
massive deflationary shock. Irving Fisher (1935) and later Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 
p. 489) noted that China and other non-gold countries were immune from the global 
deflation. Lai and Jr-Shiang (2003) contribute econometric evidence consistent with this 
view. Choudhri and Kochin (1980) made the point that Spain was not tied to the gold 
standard and their data purported to show that industrial production did not follow US or 
other gold bloc industrial production. None of these studies controlled for trade flows 
between countries or contemplated other financial channels of transmission as in 
Hamilton (1988), Temin (1993) or Richardson and van Horn (2007). 
 
 
II.C The Global Great Depression Deepens: 1929-1933 
In the third phase of the interwar monetary experience, nations faced the 
avalanche of the global depression. The international banking crisis in 1931 that began in 
Austria and spread to Germany and the United Kingdom eventually led to speculative 
attacks on those countries remaining on gold. Foreign demand weakened and investment 
softened besetting consumers with uncertainty and setting the economy on  a vicious 
downward cycle. Many nations eventually devalued their exchange rates to gain 
competitive advantage which often sparked retaliatory foreign devaluation. Those nations 
that clung to the gold standard tended to raise trade barriers more than other nations in 
order to offset overvalued exchange rates (Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010). Other nations   7
eliminated the free convertibility of their currencies and imposed a variety of exchange 
controls. Germany and several central European nations were the major practitioners of 
these policies in what would later be classified as the Reichsmark Bloc. Denmark and 
Japan also applied such controls to staunch gold outflows and to maintain greater control 
over internal balance.  
II.D. Stabilization and Recovery, 1933-1938  
The recovery period from late 1933 to 1938 represents a fourth phase. Many 
countries viewed their departures from gold as temporary. Policy makers, and ostensibly 
their constituents, yearned for exchange rate stability in the 1930s. To a certain degree, 
their interests were served. Instead of coordinated international devaluation and a return 
to gold, nations formed smaller blocs with smaller countries actively pegging the nominal 
exchange rate to larger members. The “Sterling Bloc” consisted of many nations in the 
British Commonwealth but also included Norway, Sweden and Finland all with close ties 
to the United Kingdom.
2  Straumann and Woitek (2009) discuss how in Sweden there 
was an over-riding policy of exchange rate stability against sterling from 1933. Canada 
re-oriented its policy to the US after 1933 the result was a very stable exchange rate from 
1934.  France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland and Switzerland carried the mantle of 
the gold bloc and consequently suffered together through a much lengthier depression 
than other nations. By 1936 this policy had ended. France devalued in 1936 and Belgium 
devalued in 1935 setting off recoveries based on monetary expansion and re-armament. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Since Denmark implemented exchange controls in 1931 we do not classify it as being in the Sterling Bloc.   8
III. Recent Empirical Research in Co-Movement and Its Importance for the 
Interwar Period  
The international business cycle co-movement literature has generally focused on 
two separate threads.  One views co-movement as the realization of shocks that have an 
underlying correlation structure. This is the common shock view. The other view focuses 
on transmission of shocks via underlying fundamentals such as economic structure, trade, 
financial connections or monetary regimes. The list of observables used in recent 
empirical studies that transmit shocks or can account for common shocks is long.   
Baxter and Koupiritsas (2005) study a comprehensive set of potential 
determinants and find three of them to be “robust” in an analysis of dyadic business cycle 
co-movement. These robust determinants are bilateral trade, similarity in level of 
development (but not necessarily similarity of industrial structure), and distance between 
countries.  Other studies that focus on trade include Frankel and Rose (1998), Canova and 
Dellas (1993) and Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003). 
Trade’s impact on co-movement is actually theoretically ambiguous. Output 
would be more highly correlated when foreign goods are complementary to domestic 
production as argued in di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009). Oppositely, in the canonical 
international business cycle model of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992), hit trade could 
be correlated with low co-movement due to the strong substitutability of goods.  
Debate as to whether monetary coordination is empirically associated with greater 
co-movement also still rages. Artis and Zhang (1997) find evidence that lower exchange 
rate volatility is associated with lower co-movement. Clark and van Wincoop (2001) fail 
to find evidence for the idea that monetary regimes matter for co-movement.    9
For the interwar period, a large literature exists, some of which have already been 
cited above. However, no study that we are aware of has yet looked at the many possible 
determinants of co-movement in the interwar period jointly and systematically. Bordo 
and Helbling (2003) use factor analysis to demonstrate that the years 1930-1932 
witnessed large global shocks mostly emanating from the US. They also argue that the 
gold standard raised co-movement.  The explanation is likely along the lines of Choudhri 
and Kochin (1980) and Temin (1993) who wrote that the gold standard required a 
deflationary response to negative foreign monetary shocks. Temin (1993) also provides 
anecdotal evidence that financial linkages were a pathway for transmission of the 
Depression. Perri and Quadrini (2002) find that trade restrictions and real wage rigidities 
can explain three-fourths of the 1930s depression in Italy. Trade in this case was a 
channel for business cycle transmission since foreign inputs were important for the 
productivity of the local economy. We now turn to evidence at the bilateral level based 
on a multivariate regression analysis. 
 
IV Methodology and Data 
IV.A  Regression models for bilateral co-movement 
To analyze co-movement of industrial output between two countries, we estimate a panel 




ijt t jt it ijt ijt X            (1)   10
where i and j indexes the two countries in the pair, t indexes a set of non-overlapping 
two-year periods 1920-1921, 1922-1923,…,1936-1937, ρ is the within-period correlation 
at the pair-level of the non-trend component of the logarithm of the monthly index of 
industrial production, X is a set of determinants defined at the bilateral level, β a set of 
coefficients to be estimated, γ and μ represent interactions between country i  and j and 
the vector of period indicator variables collected in δ, and ε is a pair-specific error term.  
The logic of equation (1) is to relate co-movement of the cyclical component in 
industrial production between any two countries to bilateral observables, domestic 
unobservables that might affect co-movement with all partners equally, global shocks, 
and shocks or transmission mechanisms idiosyncratic to the pair.
3 Naturally, at this level 
of aggregation, and without further structure on the model, we are unable to identify 
whether estimated coefficients on included covariates represent transmission mechanisms 
or represent co-variation in the underlying shocks.  
Bilateral observables include two key factors. First, information on bilateral 
(nominal) exchange rates yields a measure of similarity in monetary outcomes or 
policies. Next, trade flows measure the potential for transmission of shocks in the real 
economy. Domestic unobservables control for a host of policies such as exchange 
controls, tariff rises, non-tariff barriers, industrial structure, and so forth. Country-pair 
fixed effects can also be included to control for pair-specific shifts in correlation and 
similarity in policy or economic structure. Finally period indicators control for common 
shocks throughout the set of countries. Spatial correlation in the error terms, and hence 
                                                 
3   See Baxter and Koupiritsas (2005), Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Imbs (2004), Frankel and Rose 
(1998), Flood and Rose (2009) for examples of a dyadic approach similar to ours. Other papers like the 
long-run comparative paper of Bordo and Helbling (2003) use factor analysis and concordance indices 
to study co-movement.   11
bias in the estimated standard errors is built into the standard dyadic approach. This is 
due to the fact that country i appears in multiple observations at any time t. We include 
country level dummies which alleviates this problem as discussed in Case (1991).  
For our baseline sample, we have data on industrial production and other co-
variates for ten countries. Due to some missing trade data for certain country pairs we use 
a balanced panel with 342 usable observations or 39 dyads in our regressions. We also 
have data for another 6 countries beginning with the late 1920s, and are able to use these 
data in a highly unbalanced sample to illustrate robustness. We estimate equation (1) by 
OLS or two stage least squares to control for the potential endogeneity of trade and we 
use heteroscedasticity/autocorrelation robust standard errors clustered on the country pair. 
IV.B Data 
IV.B.1 Measuring and Filtering of Production Indicators 
We use data on indexes of industrial production or proxies for industrial production when 
these are not available. The proxies are all based on information from leading sectors.
4 
These data are all available at monthly frequencies and were compiled by the League of 
Nations in various issues of the  monthly Bulletin of Economic Statistics and the 
International Abstract of Economic Statistics (Tinbergen, 1934).  The countries included 
in our sample are listed in Table 1.  Data for Denmark, Norway, and Sweden were used 
in Klovland (1998).
5  We de-trend the logarithm of the monthly indexes using the HP 
                                                 
4 For Austria, pig iron and steel is used from 1919-1936, and an industrial production index is used for the 
remaining years. For Belgium and the United Kingdom, pig iron plus steel is used for the entire period.  
For Canada, the United States, Japan, and France an index of industrial production is used for the entire 
period 
5 Jan Tore Klovland graciously shared these data with us. Klovland uses production indices for the 
manufacturing and mining sectors to estimate industrial production at a monthly frequency.  Sweden 
has industrial production data from 1925, but Klovland adds data going back to 1919.   12
filter with a smoothing parameter of 129600 as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002).
6 
The de-trending procedure we employ eliminates most large shocks to these series caused 
by general strikes. In particular, the UK’s index falls dramatically in 1921 and 1926.  
 
IV.B.2 Determinants of Co-Movement 
    We use total bilateral trade flows divided by the sum of the two countries’ 
GDPs in the first year of the two year period as a measure of bilateral trade integration.
7 
This variable is highly correlated with geographic variables such as distance and whether 
nations share a border. In light of the fact that GDP is part of the trade integration 
measure, these two variables are plausible, excluded instrumental variables (cf. Frankel 
and Rose, 1998).
8  
To examine whether the data are consistent with the possibility that the gold 
standard transmitted shocks, we constructed a gold standard variable that measures how 
many months out of the 24 months in each period both countries were on gold de facto 
and de jure. Sources for these dates include Brown (1940), Wandschneider (2005) and 
Eichengreen and Sachs (1985).   
To determine whether countries are de facto pegged or not, we use an approach 
similar to that in Shambaugh (2004).  In Shambaugh’s classification, countries that stay 
within a 2% band in 11 of 12 months (for a given year) are considered as pegged, while 
countries that are outside of the band for at least 2 months in a year are considered to be 
                                                 
6 Our results are robust to using the Baxter King filter (Baxter and King, 1995), the Christiano-Fitzgerald 
filter (2003) and a simple log-linear trend. 
7 Data on trade underlie Jacks, Meissner, Novy (forthcoming). Sources are described thoroughly therein. 
Missing data were available from Barbieri (1996). 
8 Other theoretically consistent measures of bilateral integration, first developed by Head and Ries (2001), 
are available and are used for instance by Jacks, Meissner and Novy (forthcoming). Regression results 
are robust and even more precisely estimated when using this measure, but they involve more 
explanation for their derivation. For the sake of brevity we rely on trade shares.    13
de-facto floats.  We have modified that approach slightly, as we are using two-year 
periods.  We construct the variable “peg” equal to 1 in each month if the absolute value 
of the difference between the log of the current and the log of the initial nominal 
exchange rate exchange rate is less than .02, and no country in the pair had exchange 
controls.
9  The variable we use in the regressions is then the percentage of the 24 months 
within the two-year period that this indicator equals one.  
We also include a set of indicator variables for each country in the dyad each of 
which is interacted the period indicators. These “time-varying country fixed effects” 
control for unobservable shocks and transmission mechanisms at the country level within 
each period affecting co-movement with all other countries. It is not hard to think of 
policies and forces that acted “multilaterally” instead of bilaterally but which are 
extremely hard to measure directly. These include trade policy and tariffs, exchange 
controls, the effective multilateral exchange rate regime, fiscal policies, financial crises 
and so forth. Naturally we include the constituent terms of these interactions such as 
time-invariant country fixed effects and a set of period dummies. The latter also control 
for global shocks that affect all countries equally including a scramble for gold reserves, 
an international liquidity crisis in the world’s financial system, commodity price shocks, 
etc. In some specifications, we add country-pair fixed effects so as to control for 
(unobservable) similar policies and structures at the country pair level. 
 
V.  Results 
Table 2 presents baseline results for our balanced sample based on a regression 
like that of equation (1). The key explanatory variables are the bilateral level of trade 
                                                 
9 Table 1 shows the dates for exchange controls and adherence to the gold standard.   14
integration and the percentage of the time period a dyad has a de-facto fixed exchange 
rate.  Fixed exchange rates have a large, positive and significant association with bilateral 
co-movement. The impact of a one standard deviation rise in the “average fixed” variable 
(equal to 0.38 or an extra nine months of low movement in the exchange rate) is 
associated with a rise in the correlation of 0.09 or 21% of one standard deviation of the 
dependent variable. Column 3 reports a specification with country-pair fixed effects. 
Given the strong persistence of bilateral trade relationships, the coefficient on trade is no 
longer significant. Still, the coefficient on fixed exchange rates is of the same magnitude 
as in column (1) and (2), and it remains significant. In columns (4) and (5) we see similar 
evidence that the gold standard was associated with co-movement.
10 The data are indeed 
supportive of the idea that the gold standard acted as a channel for the international 
transmission of the Great Depression. 
Trade also appears as a statistically significant determinant of business cycle co-
movement.  The instrumental variable estimation in column (2) uses the gravity-inspired 
variables - border and the logarithm of distance between capitals in kilometers - as 
excluded instruments.
 11  The instrumental variables regression shows that trade has a 
larger positive association with co-movement than using OLS. In the OLS regression, a 
one percentage point rise in the trade ratio is associated with a 6% rise in the dependent 
variable. The economic significance of trade is much smaller than that of the pegged 
exchange rate variable.  Here a one standard deviation rise in the trade ratio is associated 
                                                 
10 We also used the standard deviation of the monthly change of the log of the nominal exchange rate as a 
proxy for exchange rate stability. This variable was negatively correlated with co-movement and also 
statistically significant. 
11 Instrumental variable results are robust to using the logarithm of the trade share instead of the level. As 
well as the logarithm of the trade cost measure discussed in Jacks, Meissner and Novy (forthcoming).    15
with rise in the correlation equivalent to 1/20 of a standard deviation of the dependent 
variable. 
In Figure 3 we show another way to gauge the importance of trade flows versus 
exchange rate regimes in explaining co-movement using counterfactual predictions. First 
we show the predicted values of the dependent variable from the model estimated in 
Table 2 column 2. Next the line labeled “1928-29” peg uses the same model but predicts 
correlations using the bilateral value of the fixed exchange rate variable in 1928-29. Since 
1928-29 is a period when the average time spent on a peg is 0.866, this counterfactual 
assess what co-movement might have been like had most nations clung to fixed exchange 
rate regimes in other years. The 1928-29 trade values line predicts using the trade values 
from 1928-29 and the actual values for other variables.  
It is quite clear that co-movement would have been significantly higher in the 
early 1920s and in the early 1930s had nations been bound together by a system of fixed 
exchange rates. The average predicted correlation would have been 0.16 points higher in 
1932-33 in a counterfactual world where nations maintained their fixed exchange rates 
instead of abandoning them during the initial years of the depression. However, the gap 
between the predicted values using the actual data and the counterfactual world where 
most nations are fixed and free of exchange controls narrows to half this size by 1936-37. 
The latter finding is attributable to the resurgence of fixed exchange rates among certain 
blocs of nations. 
Still, the overall unconditional fall in correlations after 1933, when trade was 
recovering and exchange rates were less volatile is surprising. The explanation is that 
inter-bloc exchange rate volatility fell more slowly or rose while intra bloc exchange rate   16
volatility fell more quickly. This induced an overall lower average correlation via inter-
bloc correlations that were falling more quickly than intra-bloc correlations. The 
unconditional simple average bilateral correlation of industrial production for pairs that 
were floating, or where one nation had adopted exchange controls, fell from 0.3 in 1932-
33 to 0.11. On the other hand, for pairs that were fixed more than 75 percent of each two 
year period, this correlation only fell from 0.36 to 0.33.  
 
VI. Further Findings and Robustness Checks 
All regressions in Table 2 include time effects that bluntly control for common 
shocks as well as country fixed effects that vary by period. Based on the levels of the 
period indicators in regressions without time-varying country fixed effects, we find 
strong evidence for common shocks between 1928 and 1931. Here 1928-29 and 1930-31 
have the largest and most significant intercepts. Also, the fact that the coefficient on trade 
flows is highly significant and larger than in Table 2 column (1) with the exclusion of the 
time-varying country-dummies (this is left unreported) also suggests to us that trade 
policy at the multilateral level changed correlations significantly.  
Table 3 examines the relationships between co-movement, trade and exchange 
rate regimes for three periods. This is one way to better understand the evolution of co-
movement in the 1930s versus the 1920s. The first period includes four two-year sub-
periods: 1920-21, 1922-23, 1924-25 and 1926-27 covering reconstruction of the gold 
standard and a relatively benign international environment. The next period marks the 
Great Depression between 1928 and 1931. The last period of recovery, exchange controls   17
and reformulation of currency and trade blocs includes observations from the two-year 
periods of 1932-33, 1934-35, and 1936-37.  
Trade is only significant in the first period covered in Table 3. In the second 
period, the trade coefficient is small and insignificant. By the third period, it regains a 
magnitude comparable to that in the first period, but it is no longer significant. In the first 
period, the exchange rate pegs indicator is positive and significant. In the second period, 
the size of the coefficient on the exchange rate peg is much smaller (0.12 vs. 0.44) and is 
significantly different from zero only at the 17 percent level. There is also a similar 
change to the gold standard indicator although this is variable is much less precisely 
estimated than either the peg variable or the gold standard variable in the pooled sample 
from Table 2. The “common shock” of the Great Depression must explain a lot of the 
variance in co-movement between 1928 and 1931 and hence one of the reasons that these 
variables drop in significance. A second possibility is that temporal aggregation is too 
coarse to pick up on differences in the timing of the shock and changes in policy. A final 
possibility is that there are other channels such as financial connections or other 
unobservables that mattered more. The relative role of each of these is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  
For the last period, we present two specifications -- one with time-varying country 
fixed effects in column (4) and one without them in column (5). In column (4), the 
pegged exchange rate variable is negative, small and not statistically significant. Next, in 
column (5), we omit the time-varying country fixed effects substituting them with an 
indicator for whether one nation in the pair had exchange controls. In this regression, the   18
fixed exchange rate variable is positive, significant and displays the magnitude it had in 
column (1) for the sample prior to 1928.    
Why is there such a difference in the outcomes? The time-varying country fixed 
effects are likely to be highly correlated with exchange control policies, trade 
interference, financial conditions and the re-orientation of economic relations that many 
nations undertook in the 1930s. They are designed to proxy for policies which countries 
adopt and which affect their relations with all countries but which are difficult to observe. 
One interpretation of this result is that these forces were more important than bilateral 
policies in the 1930s. However, there could also be problems in identification due to 
collinearity. Trade, exchange rates and exchange controls were often part of a 
comprehensive package in the 1930s to restore external and/or internal imbalance and so 
the data are too hard-pressed to find any relationship with so many controls.  One 
possibility, as we have shown, is to exclude these time varying fixed effects. If we 
exclude them, there is a risk of omitted variable bias. Column (5) might seem to confirm 
this possibility, since when the time-varying country fixed effects are omitted, the pegged 
exchange rate variable retains its magnitude from the 1920-1927 period. Another 
interpretation is a standard multicollinearity argument since the sign on the exchange rate 
peg flips and its standard error rises so much with the inclusion of time-varying country 
fixed effects.  
Also, if we exclude the exchange rate peg and the exchange control indicator but 
do include trade relations the trade variable is estimated at 0.17 and has a p-value of 
0.168. Furthermore, a scatter plot (unreported) of the bilateral correlations versus the 
exchange rate peg shows a clear positive relationship. Again, all of this points in the   19
direction of the possibility of a correlation between the many policies implemented as a 
means of recovery in the 1930s and exchange rate policy. Given the findings in column 
(1), those from the previous literature on the interwar period, and the overall literature on 
monetary regimes and co-movement, it is not unreasonable to think that there was still an 
association between exchange rate pegs and co-movement in the late 1930s but that it is 
difficult to tease out of the limited amount of data with our demanding baseline 
specification. 
Finally, we present results from a larger sample in column (6). This extended 
sample includes six new countries that have data available largely from the 1930s 
onwards. Again, we remove the time-varying country fixed effects. In this sub-sample, 
trade is no longer significant while fixed exchange rate regimes are positive and 
significant. Additionally, exchange controls seem to promote co-movement. The nations 
included in this new subsample include many in the Reichsmark bloc so this is not totally 
surprising. Again, monetary regimes are not significant in this subsample when we 
include time-varying country fixed effects. There is also evidence of significant 
collinearity between the instruments used for trade and monetary regimes as argued by 
Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) and Ritschl and Wolf (forthcoming). When exchange rate 
regimes are excluded, the trade coefficient is estimated at 0.08 but it is not significant.  
 
 
VII.  Some Tentative Conclusions  
The interwar period brought extremely volatile conditions to most countries.  A long-
standing literature has suggested that the gold standard transmitted a monetary shock   20
across borders and can help explain why the Great Depression was a global phenomenon. 
Our results are consistent with the idea that both trade and exchange rate regimes played 
an important role in transmitting shocks in the interwar period.  These results conform 
with previous results from the literature that explore co-movement in the post-World War 
II period.  
Still, these patterns are not obvious in the aggregate data nor given the historical 
record. In fact, a puzzling aspect of the aggregate data exists. As exchange rate regimes 
made a comeback and trade recovered in the 1930s, the average level of co-movement 
actually fell to a within period low. Much of the reduction in correlation seems to be due 
to low inter-bloc correlation with higher intra-bloc correlation.  The group of nations that 
once adhered en masse to a gold standard splintered into several constituent blocs that 
amongst them were highly asynchronous.  
While the breakdown of the gold standard and the consequent devaluations that the 
1930s produced were probably necessary to achieve recovery from the Great Depression, 
this was not the final nail in the coffin of integration. Nations revealed a preference for 
recovering coordinated monetary policies and trade persisted. This kept them exposed to 
shocks from abroad.  However, by the 1930s, policies of coordination and integration 
formed amongst smaller units. Between these blocs and units, co-movement appears to 
have fallen. Whether policy makers acted in a conscious attempt to avoid co-movement 
with some nations by forming “optimal” blocs, what the costs and benefits of such 
tradeoffs might have been, and how deep the contemporary understanding of these 
processes was remain interesting avenues for further research even 80 years after   21
Winston Churchill and Irving Fisher first noted the role of monetary regimes as a source 
for interdependence. 
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Figure 3 Predicted values of bilateral correlation of de-trended industrial production 






Notes: The line showing predicted bilateral correlation values gives the un-weighted 
arithmetic average of the actual predicted values from the regression model of Table 2 
column 2. The line for 1928-29 peg values uses the same model but predicts bilateral 
correlations using the bilateral value of the fixed exchange rate variable in 1928-29 
















1920 1925 1930 1935
Year
Predicted values 1928-29 trade values
1928-29 peg values